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Abstract
In this paper we present a signaling model in which individuals engage in socially
benecial but costly activities to convey information about their willingness to cooper-
ate with other agents. When several activities are available, the inclusion of monetary
compensations in anyone of them a¤ects the relative costs of undertaking each activity
and, therefore, their informative value for agents. We nd the subsidies that maximize
social welfare, which are shown to depend critically on the reputation gained from each
activity. Finally, we use comparative statics analysis to study the e¤ects on optimal
subsidies of changes in their determinants.
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1 Introduction
Prosocial activities, such as volunteering, blood donations or giving to charities, are es-
sentially privately provided public goods, and donors face a Prisoners Dilemma situation.
Public decision makers often establish subsidies to encourage the provision levels of activities
that generate positive externalities, but the empirical evidence suggests that material incen-
tives can backre in practice, inducing partial or total crowding out of prosocial behavior1.
Several psychological mechanisms have been proposed in the literature to account for this;
Bowles and Polanía-Reyes (2012) argue that incentives may (i) provide information about
the person who implemented the incentive, (ii) frame the decision situation so as to suggest
appropriate behavior, (iii) compromise a control averse individuals sense of autonomy, and
(iv) a¤ect the process by which people learn new preferences. In this paper, we obtain a
particular crowding-out e¤ect for a new reason: since agents may use a number of mutually
exclusive prosocial activities to signal their degree of altruism credibly, monetary incentives
will change their relative costs (or prices) and, therefore, cause shifts in behavior that may
lead to a lower aggregate level of all prosocial activities.
Imagine that a local government is considering subsidizing two volunteer activities: (1)
conservation (repairing paths, clearing ponds and waterways or planting trees), and (2)
caregiving (providing assistance and support to people with developmental needs, eg. helping
1See Frey and Jegen (2001) for a survey, and Gneezy, Meier and Rey-Biel (2011) for an analysis of the
contexts where incentives (dont) work to modify behavior.
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Although the new incentive encourages people to participate in conservation activities, it
might also reduce the amount of volunteer caregiving, even to the extent of decreasing the
total amount of volunteering. This paradoxical result can be attributed to cross e¤ects
arising when subsidies for (potentially competing) prosocial activities change their relative
benets.
There are many real-world examples where material incentives for a prosocial activity
crowd out other similar and related prosocial activities. For instance, Robért and Jonsson
(2006) nd that a free public transport policy does not substantially reduce private vehicle
use. Instead, this policy crowds out other prosocial modes of transport such as walking or
cycling. Similarly, economic incentives on electric vehicles, although replacing conventional
vehicles to some extent, also increase overall car transport and substitute public transport
and other means of transport2. Kits et al (2014) show that the introduction of incentives for
conservation activities (in the form of conservation auctions) reduces monetary donations to
an environmental charity. Lilley and Slonim (2014) nd that time donations (volunteering)
and monetary donations are likely to be net substitutes, and that a matching donation is
e¤ective in increasing monetary donations, but also causes a substitution away from vol-
unteering. In the context of solid waste management and recycling, empirical studies by
Kinnaman and Fullerton (2000) and Hong (1999), among others, show that collection fees
2See, for instance, Franke et al. (2012), Figembaum et al. (2014), Halvorsen and Frøyen (2009), or
Holtsmark and Skonhoft (2014).
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rst character-ize the optimal structure of incentives on prosocial activities and then explore its sensitivity
to certain changes in the system. In order to provide a rationale to cross crowding out e¤ects
we consider that the agents are heterogeneous in their degree of social preferences. Since the
agents willingness to cooperate (the "type") is private information, individuals use prosocial
activities as an instrument to signal their types credibly. Even though agents do not have
preferences about prosocial activities per se, they are concerned with the reputation associ-
ated with each activity. Hence, in the separating equilibrium of a signaling game, activities
(with di¤erent costs) are classied according to the reputation benets they entail for in-
dividuals. We show that incorporating explicit rewards in one activity changes the relative
costs of all prosocial activities, and this induces substitution e¤ects among activities. This is
because the change in relative costs modies the information conveyed through the choice of
each action. Prosocial activities can therefore be interpreted as "competing signals" in the
sense that they are alternative channels for signaling credible information about reputation.
The explicit consideration of multiple activities produces a number of insights that could
not have been obtained otherwise. Consider the example in the second paragraph of this
section, and assume (w.l.o.g.) that conservation (activity 1) is more costly to the agent than
caregiving (activity 2). In equilibrium, conservation activities provide a high reputation and
caregiving activities provide a moderate reputation. A subsidy on conservation activities
displaces the highest-type caregivers to conservation. This elimination of the best among
the caregivers reduces the reputational benet to caregiving. This leads to the lowest-
type caregivers to abandon caregiving. The set of people who dont contribute thus grows.
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the subsidy for caregiving increased, or both.
The comparative statics analysis on optimal subsidies also o¤ers a number of seemingly
counter-intuitive results. For example, if the cost of conservation activities increases, it is op-
timal to lower subsidies for both activities. Moreover, if conservation activities become more
popular or socially valued, it is optimal to increase the subsidy for voluntary caregiving too.
Rather surprisingly, a higher valuation of caregiving activities may induce lower subsidies
for them. It should be noted that the cross crowding-out e¤ects between activities identied
in this paper are far from being specic or pathological cases. On the contrary, they take
place under reasonably general conditions. Thus, our results point to the importance of
considering these new complexities in the design of optimal incentives by policy-makers.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 o¤ers a brief background of the related liter-
ature. Section 3 sets up the basic framework of analysis and presents the individuals utility
functions. Section 4 studies the equilibrium choice of the agents for a given subsidy scheme.
Section 5 analyzes the impact of subsidies on the supply of prosocial activities, which allows
us to identify the crowding-out e¤ects across activities. In Section 6, after an appropriate
denition of social welfare, we characterize the optimal subsidy prole. In Section 7, we
perform comparative statics analysis to ascertain how optimal subsidies change in response
to exogenous changes in their determinants. Section 8 presents the main conclusions of the
paper. The proofs of the main results in the text can be found in Appendix A (online). Ap-
pendices B and C (also online) are devoted to analyzing examples, extensions and robustness
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In this paper we study a problem in which a social planner must devise a subsidy scheme for
multiple prosocial activities used by the agents as alternative signaling devices. This problem
is related to the well-known multitask problem, pioneered in a seminal paper by Holmstrom
and Milgrom (1991) and used by other authors since then3. The multitask approach is
developed in a principal-agent setting, mainly in the context of rm organization. A rst
di¤erence of the multitask approach, with respect to our model, is that the agents actions
(typically e¤ort) are not perfectly observable, leading to a moral hazard problem, whereas
in our approach the performance of prosocial activities is public information. In fact, the
agents use these activities to signal their willingness to cooperate. Secondly, in a multitask
approach, the agents cost depends on the total e¤ort devoted to all tasks, which can then
be complements or substitutes. The e¤ort exerted by the agent in one task may crowd out
the other task because the tasks are not technologically independent. Instead, in our model,
agents can only choose one action from a nite set of alternatives (e.g., recycling garbage
vs. waste deposits in bins and bags, or public transport vs. bicycle). As in the multitasking
approach, our model includes standard substitution e¤ects due to changes in relative prices.
This is why, for instance, a subsidy on electric vehicles (EVs) displaces some purchases from
conventional vehicles to EVs. However, unlike the multitasking approach, this change in
relative prices also a¤ects the reputational value of all modes of transport. Thus, while some
people switch from conventional cars to electric cars (this is the desired e¤ect of the policy),
3For a survey on multitask agency theory, see Dewatripont et al. (2000).
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the equilibrium partition of their types.
In the context of prosocial activities, our multi-activity approach is related to Ek (2017,
2018), who estimates the magnitude of cross-price e¤ects across prosocial alternatives. This
author nds evidence that substitution decreases as activities become more dissimilar. Specif-
ically, in Ek (2018), it is shown that there exist su¢cient conditions under which facilitating
one activity crowds out e¤ort in other activities. One major di¤erence from our model is
that Ek (2018) does not account for the agents concern with reputation. A signaling model
with multi-dimensional actions is also used in Ellingsen and Johannesson (2011) to study
the choice of monetary vs. non-monetary gifts. Individuals are either selsh or altruistic
and they receive indirect utility from social esteem. The main di¤erence with our model is
that in Ellingsen and Johannesson (2011) agents receive some (compassion) utility from the
opponents consumption level.
One branch of social psychology literature studies the e¤ect of explicit incentives on in-
dividuals "intrinsic motivation" to undertake certain activities. Extrinsic motivation (e.g.
monetary incentives) may displace intrinsic motivation, even to the extent of being counter-
productive. Some authors have dealt with this by assuming a reduced-form crowding-out
function of intrinsic motivation (e.g., Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1996). Recent approaches
to understanding the Motivation Crowding-Out E¤ect involve endogeneizing, rather than
assuming, the way individuals behave when faced with explicit rewards or penalties. Contri-
butions by Bénabou and Tirole (2006) (B & T from now on) and Seabright (2009) emphasize
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bi-dimensional type, with one dimension accounting for altruism and the other for greed.
Rewards on a prosocial activity introduce noise to the signal-extraction problem of the
agents type. Under a certain range of parameters, and assuming that types are normally
distributed, B & T identify instances in which incentives for the social activity reduce its
supply. Very related to B & T, Seabright (2009) analyzes a screening context in which
agents decide to participate in a civic activity or not after some reward for participating has
been announced. This author considers a sorting condition that establishes that the agents
expected gain from a protable assortative matching in the future is increasing in the agents
type.
Unlike B & T, we consider one-dimensional types, and the social activities can be sub-
sidized separately. The (rather restricting) sorting condition in Seabright (2009) is not re-
quired in our model, but we must consider at least two prosocial activities to obtain our cross
crowding out e¤ects. Both in B & T and Seabright (2009) there is a trade-o¤ between the
direct e¤ect of rewards and their indirect e¤ects on the agents reputation and/or intrinsic
motivation. The agents equilibrium choice in the face of this trade-o¤ involves, under some
circumstances, a lower supply of the social activity that has been incentivized. In contrast,
the mechanism that drives crowding out in our paper is based on substitution e¤ects among
di¤erent activities, whose relative cost can be modied by subsidies. In our framework, re-
wards for a given activity a¤ect the information that agents reveal when undertaking other
activities. This makes it possible, for instance, to a¤ect the aggregate supply of activity A
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B&Ts model, subsidies on EVs spoil the signaling value of acquiring an EV to the extent
that the purchases of EVs may even decrease. In our model, instead, the lower cost of EVs
after the subsidy induces people to replace conventional cars by electric cars (the price e¤ect
predominates over the reputation e¤ect on the subsidized activity). However, the change
in relative prices also a¤ects the reputation associated to other modes of transport. The
empirical evidence reveals a displacement of other good activities like walking, cycling or
public transport, jointly with an increase in overall car use. A major di¤erence with B&T,
then, is that our model includes reputational spillovers among activities. Such e¤ects become
apparent also in other contexts. For instance, as shown in Kinnaman and Fullerton (2000),
the introduction of collection fees on waste disposal aimed to encourage recycling activities
has the undesirable side e¤ect of increasing illegal dumping or burning.
The standard public economics approach to the analysis of subsidies (taxes) relies on the
general principle that agents respond to incentives. Governments use subsidies to promote
activities that generate positive externalities, or taxes to discourage activities that cause
negative externalities. Bowles and Hwang (2008) combine the public economics approach
with the analysis of individual behavior when faced with explicit incentives, like the Moti-
vation Crowding Out e¤ect. These authors investigate the design of optimal incentives in
a context where economic incentives and social preferences can be either complements or
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
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4 does not hold. A notable di¤erence with the
present paper is that they use a given "black box" function to model the trade-o¤ between
extrinsic and intrinsic motivation. Our approach is based on a signaling game in which indi-
viduals responses to incentives are endogenous, and intrinsic motivation is not considered.
Instead, citizens understand how explicit incentives modify the information revealed through
the performance of each activity and make rational and self-interested decisions based on
that. The reason why explicit incentives crowd-out prosocial behavior in our model is not
because they provoke a displacement of intrinsic motivation, but because they change the
reputation benets associated to each activity.
Finally, this paper is also related to Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986), who study Pareto-
improving taxes/subsidies in economies with incomplete markets and imperfect information.
In analyzing the welfare properties of signaling equilibria, these authors nd that the gov-
ernment can establish taxes or subsidies on goods that change the extent of signaling and
can lead to welfare improving allocations.
3 Model
We develop a signaling model in which a continuous set of heterogeneous agents (or indi-
viduals) undertake prosocial activities observable by all of them. Agents use this observed
behavior to estimate the other agents types, and the nal payo¤ of each agent is highly
a¤ected by the estimates about their own type made by other agents.
Let us denote the agents type by  2 [0 1]. It represents a somehow measurable personal
4The separability assumption is implicitly used in the public choice literature and establishes that the
level of material rewards or penalties does not a¤ect the agents public goods valuations.
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le characteristic or trait of agent , and is unobservable directly by agents other than , that is,each agents type is her only private information in the game. Agents types are distributedin the interval [0 1] according to cumulative distribution function (cdf)  () Therefore,
given any  2 [0 1]   () represents the fraction of the population with types lower than or
equal to . Each agent is allowed to undertake one (and only one) action from the discrete set
 = f0 1 2g. We denote as  the objective cost of carrying out action , for  = 0 1 2
and we assume 1  2  0 = 0 Actions 1 and 2 are interpreted as costly prosocial
activities. In turn, choosing the costless action, 0, means that the agent does not undertake
any prosocial activity. We also assume that individuals cannot decide about their degree of
participation in the activities chosen: they can only choose one of the three options available
to them5.
Types can be interpreted as the agents degrees of cooperative behavior or willingness to
contribute to a public good (e.g. recycling household waste, participating in voluntary social
work, etc.), or as the agents degree of altruism. In general, we talk about the individuals
willingness to cooperate. Individuals are concerned with the perceptions that others have
about their own types, so showing high reputation leads to a higher payo¤ by obtaining
better cooperative matches in future social interactions6.
Since some agents can enhance their perceived reputation by performing costly activities,
activities 1 and 2 may be used as revealing signals. We assume that the cost to agent  of
5This setting is adequate to explain the evidence of dugnads in Brekke et al (2003) or the evidence
recorded in day care centers in Gneezy and Rustichini (2000).
6In a di¤erent context, Rege (2008) considers a complementary interaction process that induces the
agents to care about social status, since the investment in status (to buy a Rolex watch) serves as a signal
of non-observable abilities (high business skills).
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0 type, so the subjective cost from
undertaking any given prosocial activity is lower for those individuals who are themselves
more cooperative. For the sake of simplicity, we propose the following linear form for the
cost7 of activity  to agent  : ( j ) = (1 ¡ ) For instance, the cost of 1 for an
individual of type  = 07 is equal to 031, while an individual whose type is  = 01 faces
a much higher cost of 091
Prosocial activities are considered pure public goods as long as their benets to society
are non-rival and non-excludable. Individuals also benet from other types of public goods
that cannot be provided individually. Let us denote by  the aggregate supply of prosocial
activity  = 1 2, and let  stand for the expenditure on other public goods. Agent 0 benet
is denoted as (1 2 ), where a fraction, , of agents take prosocial action  = 1 2,
and other goods are publicly provided at level . Note that, given the innite population
considered, all individuals have zero weight in the aggregate levels of activities8. Therefore,
from the point of view of agent , her benet (1 2 ) is exogenous, since it cannot be
signicantly a¤ected by her individual choices. We denote it simply by 
Let us consider the introduction of a subsidy scheme  = (1 2), where  ¸ 0 stands for
7In fact, all our results can be generalized to any di¤erentiable cost function such that the di¤erence
 (1 )¡ (2 ) is strictly increasing in the type  Since it is relatively cheaper for cooperative individuals
to produce the costly signal 1 the di¤erence (1 ) ¡ (2 ) is strictly increasing in  This
property, known as Increasing Di¤erences (Topkis, 1978), is a version of Spence-Mirrlees well known "single-
crossing" condition, which plays a prominent role in signaling games.
8In this sense, prosocial behavior closely resembles the action of voting in Anthony Downs "voting
paradox": Each voter faces a positive cost of casting a vote, but the voters inuence on the electoral
outcome is close to zero.
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9 established for activity  = 1 2. The policy-maker, who faces budget constraint
 ¸ 11 + 22 +  (with  being exogenous), may want to establish a subsidy scheme, ,
in order to encourage the agents to participate in prosocial activities. Given , each agent
in [0 1] chooses one (and only one) activity in set  We consider a signaling game in which
each agent plays the role of "the sender" when choosing  and the rest of the population
is receiver of the signal that updates their beliefs on the senders type after the signal has
been observed. The timing of this game is as follows: (i) each agent selects an element of
set ; (ii) all agents observe the other agents choices, and (iii) the payo¤s are realized. We
dene the strategy of agent  under subsidy scheme  as a function ( ) : [0 1]£2 ! 
The atomistic representation of the population implies that no single agent can a¤ect other
agents payo¤s, and therefore strategic interactions are absent from the analysis. However,
each individuals choice is publicly observed and a¤ects her own reputation.
We dene the reputation function of agent , who undertakes activity  under subsidy
scheme , as ( ) =  [ j  ], i.e., the mathematical expectation of the agents type
conditional on , given . This expectation accounts for the private returns of building a
"solid reputation" provided that all agents other than  (receivers) update their beliefs on
agent 0 type (the sender) after observing activity  (the signal). These private benets
can be interpreted as the discounted payo¤s from protable assortative future matching with
9In general, in this paper we analyze the e¤ect of incentives on multiple prosocial activities. Such
incentives can be positive (subsidies, if   0), or negative (taxes, if   0). For easier interpretation
of the results, though, we speak about subsidies throughout the paper.
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10.
Agent 0 preferences can be expressed by the following additively separable utility func-
tion:
( j  ) = ( ) ¡ ( j ) +  +  (1)
where the term  represents income received by agent  (in this model, the monetary amount
of subsidies received). The linear form of function  means that we are implicitly assum-
ing that the agents valuation of money is independent of her attitude towards prosocial
behavior11.
We are interested in studying the e¤ects that the introduction of subsidies have on the
aggregate supply of activities 1 and 2. For this purpose, we rst need to analyze the inuence
of subsidies on the agents equilibrium choice.
4 Individuals equilibrium choices
The subsidy prole  = (1 2) changes the relative cost of activities, thus modifying the
informative value of each signal with regard to individuals willingness to cooperate. In this
section we analyze the inuence of those subsidies on the agents equilibrium choices. After
a monetary subsidy  ¸ 0 is introduced on activity  = 1 2, the (subjective) cost of activity
 to agent  reduces to ( j ) ¡ .
Individuals are considered rational and their preferences are given by Eq. (1). Posterior
10Seabright (2009) explicitly considers a process in which e¢cient matchings are characterized after indi-
viduals choose to participate or not in a civic activity. Our reputation function is very similar to the agents
reward considered in Dewatripont et al (1999) in a multitask problem.
11We introduce altruism linearly in the same fashion as Buurman and Dur (2012).
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0 type are formed after action  is observed. Let () be the prior
density function over the types. We dene as () the belief regarding agent 0 type after
everybody observes that agent  undertakes activity , given the current subsidy scheme 
Namely, () =  ( j   ).
The agents payo¤s and strategies, the set of possible types and the prior distribution
function of the types dene a dynamic Bayesian game. In order to solve this game, we
use the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium concept, and refer to it simply as "equilibrium". In
equilibrium, beliefs are updated according to Bayes rule given the agents actions, and each
agent chooses the action that maximizes her utility given these beliefs.
We focus our attention on a semi-separating equilibrium in which those agents with
higher types undertake activity 1 intermediate types undertake activity 2 and the lower
types choose not to carry out any activity. Let us then consider a partition of interval [0 1],
with £ ½ [0 1] being the set of agents who choose action , for  = 0 1 2 Note that
the equilibrium characterized here is not fully separating, i.e., the choice of an action does
not reveal the exact true value of  Instead, the set of agents is partitioned into three
subsets, and each agent is pooled with all the other agents who belong to the same subset.
Information is not fully revealed because the agents are only allowed to choose from a discrete
set of actions12.
Denition 1: An equilibrium is a set of strategies ¤ ( ) and beliefs ¤(), for all 
12Technically, we compute a semi-pooling equilibrium, in which some types of agents choose the same
action, while other types choose di¤erent actions. A pure separating equilibrium is not possible when there
is a continuum of types but a discrete set of signaling actions.
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rt
ic
le and for  = 0 1 2 such that¤ ( ) = argmaxfg ( j  ) = 8>>>>>><>>>>>>: 1 if  2 £12 if  2 £20 if  2 £0
and
¤() =
8
>><
>>:
 ( j ¤ ( ) ) if  2 £
0 if  2 £
According to the beliefs in Denition 1, an individual who undertakes 1 must belong to
set £1 A similar inference is made for individuals who choose 2 and 0. We further adopt
the Intuitive Criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987) as a renement on beliefs in order to rule out
pooling equilibria13.
The reputation function of agent  with type  2 [0 1], evaluated at the equilibrium
strategy ¤ ( ), is given by
(¤ ( ) ) =  [ j ¤ ( ) ] =
Z
2£
 () 
Z
2£
 () 
 (2)
Lemma 1: Given the equilibrium reputation associated to each action choice, the par-
tition of interval [0 1] into sets £1 £2 and £0 is characterized as £1 = [ 1], £2 = [ ]
13Consider a trivial equilibrium in which each agent chooses 0 regardless of his type and () = ()
for each , i.e., the agents actions do not a¤ect their reputations. Given these beliefs, choosing action 0
is optimal since this action is costless and the other (costly) actions have no inuence in (12 ). This
equilibrium would not satisfy the Intuitive Criterion: an agent with low type is never interested in deviating
to action 2 or 1 However, such deviations may be protable for higher types for beliefs other than those
assumed in the trivial pooling equilibrium. Then, if some agent deviates from choosing 0, she must be of
high type, and it is "not intuitive" that this agent does not improve her reputation by choosing 2 or 1
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le and £0 = [0 ], where  is the unique type of agent indi¤erent to choosing 1 or 2, and is the unique type indi¤erent between 2 and 0.Proof: See Appendix A.
The information inferred from each action is summarized in the average type correspond-
ing to each interval (i.e., reputation). In an interior equilibrium14, thresholds  and  must
be such that 0 ·  ·  · 1 Observe that thresholds  and  are parameterized by the
subsidy scheme  For notational simplicity, though, we shall omit  as an argument of 
and  throughout the paper. We write the equilibrium reputation in Eq. (2) of an agent
who undertakes activity 1 as (1 ) = 1(). Similarly, the terms 2( ) and 0()
refer to the reputation of individuals who take actions 2 and 0, respectively. Note that,
under our conditions, the reputation functions 1(), 2( ) and 0() are continuous and
strictly increasing in their arguments (see Balakrishnan, 2001). For the sake of simplicity,
in the analysis that follows we assume that they are also di¤erentiable. We denote as 
and  (with  = 0 1 2) the partial derivatives of functions () with respect to  and ,
respectively. Then, it holds that 1  0, 2  0 2  0 and 0  0 It is useful to dene
¢ = 2 ¡ 0 and ¢ = 1 ¡ 2 as the relative reputation gains from variations in
thresholds  and , respectively.
Lemma 2: If the agents types are distributed according to a concave cdf  (), then it
holds that ¢ ¸ 0 and ¢ ¸ 0
Proof: See Appendix A.
Conditions ¢ ¸ 0, ¢ ¸ 0 have a fairly simple interpretation: ¢ ¸ 0 means that,
14In Appendix B (online) we discuss the existence of other possible semi-separating equilibria which may
arise under certain parameter congurations.
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le if some individuals (those at the bottom of set £2) abandon activity 2 and select 0 instead(i.e.,  increases), the reputation gain of individuals who remain in set £2 is greater than orequal to the reputation gain for individuals in set £0. A similar interpretation can be given
to condition ¢ ¸ 0. In the rest of the paper we assume that  () is concave. In order
to obtain an interior equilibrium in the next proposition, we also assume that the cost 2 is
high enough relative to subsidy 2
Proposition 1: If the cdf of the types,  () is concave and the cost 2 is high enough
relative to subsidy 2, an interior equilibrium ( ) exists where  and  are fully determined
by the following two equations:
1() ¡ (1 ¡ )1 + 1 = 2( ) ¡ (1 ¡ )2 + 2 (3)
2( ) ¡ (1 ¡ )2 + 2 = 0() (4)
Proof: See Appendix A.
For any given pair (1 2), Eqs. (3) and (4) in Proposition 1 implicitly dene thresholds
 and  as a function of subsidies 1 and 2.
5 Cross crowding-out e¤ects
Once we have derived the equilibrium choices of the agents for a given subsidy scheme , we
are interested in the local response of thresholds  and  to small changes in the subsidy on
activity 1 (1  0) and/or in the subsidy on activity 2 (2  0). In a separating equilibrium,
like the one characterized above, the level of activity 1 is 1() =
Z 1

(), the level
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Z 

() and the aggregate level of prosocial activities15 is
given by 1()+2( ) =
Z 1

 () Observe that the signs of the following derivatives
hold for any density function (): 01  0
2
  0
2
  0
(1 +2)
  0 and
(1 +2)
 = 0
In this section we characterize cross crowding-out e¤ects as follows: (i) subsidizing the
most costly activity reduces the supply of the least costly activity and the total supply of
prosocial activities; and, (ii) raising the subsidy on the least costly activity may a¤ect the
supply of the most costly activity negatively.
Next we analyze the inuence of subsidies on the supply of prosocial activities. We denote
by 
¡

¢
the derivative of threshold  () with respect to subsidy , with  = 1 2 We
resort to implicit di¤erentiation in Eqs. (3) and (4) to obtain
1 =
2
  (5)
1 = ¡
¢ + 2
  (6)
2 = ¡
1 + 1 ¡ 2
  (7)
2 =
2 ¡ 0
  (8)
with  = 22 + (¢ + 2) (¢ + 1 ¡ 2) 
Note that Lemma 2 implies that   0, so we can obtain a clear sign of the derivatives
above.
Proposition 2: (i) A subsidy on activity 1 increases the supply of activity 1 (1  0),
but also reduces the aggregate supply of prosocial activities (1  0) and the supply of activity
15By construction, in our model we have that 1 +2 +0 = 1 An alternative interpretation of the model
would be to consider that there is a single agent with possible types drawn from the interval [0 1], and then
 would be the probability that this individual chooses action  given prole .
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le 2 (1 ¡ 1  0); (ii) A subsidy on activity 2 increases the total supply of prosocial activities(2  0), but it crowds out activity 1 (2  0) if 2  0Proof: Straightforward from Eqs. (5)-(8).
In order to develop some intuition about crossed crowding out e¤ects, suppose that 1
increases. In this case, the lower cost of activity 1 after the subsidy induces the most
cooperative agents in set £2 to shift to activity 1, thus worsening the reputation of the
agents who keep doing activity 2. This reputation loss causes some individuals (those at
the bottom of set £2) to abandon activity 2 and select 0 instead. The equilibrium supply
of activity 2 decreases for two reasons: some people substitute it by activity 1 (the highest
types in £2) and other people substitute it by activity 0 (the lowest types in £2). On the
other hand, if 2 increases, the condition that ensures crowding out e¤ects on the supply of
activity 1 (2  0) is 2  0  The e¤ect of an increase in 2 on the supply of activity 1 is,
in general, ambiguous because it is the combination of two opposite e¤ects: a direct price
e¤ect whereby activity 1 becomes more expensive with respect to the subsidized activity 2
(this would, ceteris paribus, reduce the supply of activity 1) and a reputation e¤ect that
makes activity 2 less attractive for the types at the top of set £2
Our results in Proposition 2 establish that, in general, incentives may backre due to
cross crowding out e¤ects. If the government uses a subsidy to boost the level of activity
1, it may cause a reduction of the level of activity 2 to the extent of leading to an overall
reduction of all prosocial activities. Besides, a subsidy on activity 2 may crowd-out the
supply of activity 1 if the cost of activity 2 is high enough16. The singularity of our approach
lies in the fact that a change in relative prices displaces agents between activities and this
16Specically, if the distribution function is concave, for 2  0 to hold, it is su¢cient that 2 ¸ 1
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le displacement a¤ects the reputation associated to each activity. The equilibrium partition ofindividuals, determined by thresholds  and , is ultimately a¤ected by subsidies through acombination of (direct) price e¤ects and (induced) reputation e¤ects.
There is consistent evidence that subsidies on one prosocial activity sometimes serve
to reduce other prosocial activities. For instance, in the context of household solid waste
management and recycling, Kinnaman and Fullerton (2000) estimate that a $1 user fee could
decrease the quantity of garbage by 412 pounds per person per year but increase recycling
by only 30 pounds per person per year. These authors suggest that the extra garbage might
lead to illegal dumping. Similarly, Hong (1999) concludes that a unit pricing system provides
pervasive incentives for households to dump or incinerate wastes illegally. Consider three
possible actions: Recycling waste (activity 1), traditional household waste in bins and bags
(activity 2) and illegal dumping or burning (activity 0). In the terms of our model, a waste
fee is equivalent to a reduction of the subsidy on activity 2. According to Proposition 2, it
must induce a lower level of prosocial activities (an increase in ) and also a higher rate of
recycling (a decrease in ) when 2  0 . The empirical evidence bears out this theoretical
prediction.
Purchasing an electric vehicle (EV) is a signal of environmentally friendly behavior, and
thus it inuences the agents reputation positively (Ariely et. al (2009)). Consider now the
following three modes of transport: Public transport (activity 1), use of an EV (activity
2) and use of a conventional vehicle (activity 0). Over the last few years, Norway has
implemented a generous policy of subsidies and exemptions aimed to encourage the purchase
and use of EVs. However, as stated in Holtsmark and Skonhoft (2014), this policy may not
have achieved the desired goals. A report by Halvorsen and Froyen (2009) concludes that
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le people reduce their use of public transport for commuting to work after purchasing an EV.Before the acquisition of the EV, they take 23% of their trips to work by public transport.This percentage decreases to 6% after they buy the EV. Using data from a eld study in the
Berlin metropolitan area, Franke et al (2014) report that 29.5% of EV users choose public
transport, bike or foot as modes of transport before they receive an EV, while this percentage
falls to 8.9% after receiving an EV. Figembaum et al (2014) found that, after acquiring an
EV, the use of public transportation fell by 24% of the cases, while only 4% increased their
use.
The results in Proposition 2 suggest that if the policy-maker is interested in stimulating
some activity through subsidies, she must take into account the presence of cross crowding-
out e¤ects which may induce undesired (or at least unexpected) consequences on the supply
of other activities. The governments behavior should also be shaped by its own valuation
of prosocial activities compared to the opportunity costs of subsidies. This raises a relevant
public policy issue: If the government is aware that cross crowding out e¤ects occur when
agents are concerned with reputation, how should an optimal subsidy scheme be designed?
Moreover, how would such a scheme respond to changes in its determinants? In the next
section we address both questions.
6 Optimal subsidies on prosocial activities
We use the model presented in the previous sections to characterize a subsidy prole ¤ =
(¤1 ¤2) that maximizes social welfare. Then we analyze the responsiveness of ¤ to changes
in the parameters of the model. Our analysis is carried out under the assumption that the
agents adopt the (separating) equilibrium strategies introduced in the previous sections and
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ne social welfare properly, we must take into account the budgetary costs
of subsidies for the government. Let us recall that a given public budget, , is devoted either
to providing an amount  of public goods, or to subsidizing activities 1 and/or 2. Therefore,
the government faces the following budget constraint17:
 + 11 + 22 ·  (9)
We adopt the standard utilitarian approach and dene social welfare as the sum of indi-
viduals utilities at equilibrium,  ( ) =
Z 1
0
(¤ ( ) j  ) Social welfare consists
of four elements: (i) Aggregate reputation; (ii) aggregate costs from prosocial activities;
(iii) aggregate benets from prosocial activities and other public goods, and (iv) aggregate
income:
 ( ) =
Z 1
0
(¤ ( ) ) ¡
Z 1
0
(¤ ( ) j ) + (10)
+
Z 1
0
(1 2 ) +
Z 1
0

Note that aggregate reputation does not depend on  for any distribution function of the
types. In fact, aggregate reputation is equal to the average type of an individual in [0 1],
which we call  To see this, notice that
Z 1
0
(¤ ( ) ) =
=2X
=0
Z
2£
 ()  =
Z 1
0
 ()  =  (11)
By construction of the model, wherever the thresholds  and  are located on interval [0 1],
and for any density function of the types, the sum of the expected types of the agents who
17We assume that budget  comes from non-distortionary taxation on the citizens, and we do not consider
the possibility that the government incurs in budget decit.
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le belong to sets £0 £1 and £2 is always equal to . Reputation is zero (constant) sumbecause, as in a positional game, reputation gains and losses are always compensated inaggregate terms. However, the fact that agents compete for reputation plays a fundamental
role in their motivation for prosocial behavior. Actually, in this model, reputation building
is the only driving force of prosocial activities.
The aggregate cost of prosocial activities is given by
Z 1
0
(¤ ( ) j ) = 1
Z 1

(1¡) ()+2
Z 

(1¡)() = (  1 2) (12)
Note that the cost function above depends on both the separating equilibrium thresholds 
and , and the objective costs of activities, 1 and 2
To simplify the analysis, we assume that the aggregate benet from prosocial activities
and other public goods is linear18 in 1 2 and , i.e.,
Z 1
0
(1 2 ) = 11() + 22( ) +  (13)
where 1 and 2 are the relative weights the government puts on aggregate levels of activities
1 and 2 with respect to . In order to obtain interior solutions, we assume 1 ¸ 2  0.
Finally, the aggregate income is simply the total amount of subsidies that citizens receive:
Z 1
0
 = 11 + 22 Observe that this term does not appear in the expression of social
welfare because subsidies are also included, with a negative sign, in the amount of public
goods provided,  Therefore, both terms cancel out. In fact, subsidies only a¤ect social
welfare through their inuence on the supply of prosocial activities.
We plug the value  =  ¡ 11 ¡ 22 into function  ( ) in Eq. (10) and take into
18In Appendix C we show that all our results hold if we generalize the aggregate valuation of prosocial
activities to a quasi-linear function (12) + , with 1  0 and 2  0
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le account Eqs. (11) to (13) to express social welfare as() =  + + 11() + 22( ) ¡ (  1 2) (14)
It is convenient to recall that  and  are the separating equilibrium thresholds characterized
in Eqs. (3) and (4) and, as such, both depend on subsidies 1 and 2 The terms with positive
sign in Eq. (14) are the benets enjoyed by society from the governments provision of public
goods and the private provision of prosocial activities. The term with negative sign represents
the total private signaling costs associated with prosocial activities. A subsidy prole aimed
at inducing maximization of social welfare must trade o¤ these costs and benets optimally.
In order to compute the optimal subsidies we proceed as follows: First, we compute
the thresholds ¤ and ¤ that maximize ( ). Provided that the concavity of cdf  ()
guarantees that function ( ) is strictly concave in both  and , thresholds ¤ and
¤ are the solutions for  and , respectively, of the equations system given by conditions
 = 0 and  = 0. Next, we evaluate functions 1(), 2( ) and 0() in the optimal
thresholds and write them as 1(¤), 2(¤ ¤) and 0(¤). After that, we nd the subsidies
that induce these optimal thresholds. For this purpose, we solve for 1 and 2 the system
formed by Eqs. (3) and (4), considering that reputations are given by 1(¤), 2(¤ ¤) and
0(¤). The solution yields the optimal subsidies ¤1 and ¤2.
The thresholds ¤ and ¤ that maximize function19 ( ) are given by
¤ = 1 ¡ 1 ¡ 21 ¡ 2
 (15)
¤ = 1 ¡ 22
 (16)
19The maximizing thresholds are computed in the proof of Proposition 3, in Appendix A. In order to have
¤ ¸ ¤ we must assume that the condition 12 ¸ 21 holds.
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ts and the signaling costs of prosocial activitiesequally. The next result establishes the (optimal) subsidies that are successful in imple-
menting thresholds ¤ and ¤
Proposition 3: The optimal subsidy prole ¤ = (¤1 ¤2) is characterized as
¤1 = 1 ¡ [1(¤) ¡ 0(¤)]  (17)
¤2 = 2 ¡ [2 (¤ ¤) ¡ 0(¤)]  (18)
Proof: See Appendix A.
The expression of optimal subsidies ¤1 and ¤2 in Proposition 3 holds for any concave
distribution of the agentss types20. These e¢ciency conditions have a fairly simple inter-
pretation: the optimal subsidy on activity  is equal to the di¤erence between the marginal
social benet from one more individual producing activity  and the marginal private benet
(reputation) that this individual can get by undertaking activity  instead of 0. Therefore,
optimal subsidies can be interpreted as a sort of Pigouvian subsidies in a scenario where pro-
duction of prosocial activities generates positive externalities. At the optimal subsidy prole,
the sum of both reputation and subsidy earned after contributing to activity  must be equal
to the value for society of this contribution. Note that subsidies do not only internalize the
(positive) externalities from the provision of social activities, but they also account for the
reputation benets individuals derive from contributing to prosocial activities. Therefore,
the value of subsidies is, in general, lower than it would be in the benchmark case (i.e., with-
out reputation signaling). It is worth mentioning that the characterization in Proposition 3
20Observe that, unlike optimal thresholds, optimal subsidies depend on the distribution of the individuals
types.
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le also includes the case where subsidies may be negative (i.e., taxes). Basically, the sign ofthe right incentives depends upon the magnitude of the valuations of prosocial activities (seethe example in the last section).
A distinctive feature of our approach is that individual reputation appears explicitly in
the characterization of optimal subsidies. The public policy problem posed in this section can
be summarized as follows. For any given array (1 2 1 2) there exists an optimal partition
of the interval [0 1] (given by the measure of agents that select each possible action) such
that social welfare achieves a maximum. In order to nd out which subsidy scheme manages
to implement this partition (the optimal supply of each activity) the government must take
into account that prosocial activities are used by the agents as an instrument to convey
information about their willingness to cooperate with other agents. The agents maximizing
strategy together with the governments goal of maximizing social welfare shape the form of
the right incentives for prosocial activities. Therefore, Eqs. (17) and (18) in Proposition 3
come from the combination of Eqs. (15) and (16) with Eqs. (3) and (4).
7 Comparative statics of optimal subsidies
In this section we explore how optimal subsidies respond to changes in their determinants,
namely 1 2 1 and 2. We focus our attention on results that are apparently paradoxical,
but whose rationale is grounded on the analysis of cross crowding out e¤ects presented in
Section 5. The precise formulae for the comparative statics results presented here are in
Appendix A.
We rst establish a useful result in order to understand the relationship between para-
meters 1 2 1 and 2 and the optimal thresholds ¤ and ¤ characterized in Eqs. (15)
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le and (16).Lemma 3: ¤1  0; ¤2  0; ¤1  0; ¤2  0; ¤1 = 0; ¤2  0; ¤1 = 0; ¤2  0Proof: Straightforward from Eqs. (15) and (16).
Our rst nding is that optimal subsidies vary asymmetrically in response to governmen-
tal valuations of prosocial activities, 1 and 2.
Corollary 1: 
¤
2
1
 0, and 
¤
1
2
 0.
Proof: See Appendix A.
We start by interpreting the sign of derivative 
¤
2
1
 0 Suppose that the social valuation
of activity 1 increases. Then, from Lemma 3, threshold ¤ must decrease while threshold
¤ does not change. That is, the provision of activity 1 must increase but the aggregate
supply of all activities must remain the same. This implies that the increase in activity 1
must be of the same magnitude as the decrease in activity 2. For this purpose, let us rst
consider raising 1 Since 1  0 the supply of activity 1 is stimulated. However, this also
brings about cross crowding out e¤ects on the aggregate supply of prosocial activities, since
1  0 Using the subsidy 1 alone causes an ine¢ciently high reduction in the supply of
activity 2. As long as 2  0 the optimal response of the system also includes an increase
in 2, intended to mitigate excessive decline in the level of activity 2 caused by crowding out
e¤ects.
Let us now interpret the derivative 
¤
1
2
 0. Suppose that 2 increases. From Lemma 3,
we have that ¤ must increase and ¤ must decrease. In other words, the optimal supply of
activity 1 must be reduced and the optimal supply of activity 2 must be expanded. As in the
previous case, the e¢cient way to induce these changes in thresholds comes from a certain
combination of lower 1 and higher 2. Increasing 2 may reduce the supply of activity 1
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each activity, it is also necessary to reduce 1. The reason is that the cross crowding out
e¤ect 2  0 is not strong enough, so a reduction in 1 is required to reinforce the negative
e¤ect of increasing 2 in the supply of activity 1
Our second nding is that if activity 1 becomes more costly, it is optimal to reduce the
subsidy on activity 2.
Corollary 2: 
¤
2
1  0.
Proof: See Appendix A.
The intuition for 
¤
2
1  0 is as follows. From Lemma 3, if 1 increases (for instance),
threshold ¤ increases and threshold ¤ remains constant. Since 1  0, the increase in ¤
can be achieved through a lower 1 However, as long as 1  0, the lower subsidy 1 induces
a lower value of threshold ¤. Provided that 2  0 the subsidy 2 must decrease to keep 
constant.
From the analysis above we conclude that governmental intervention in activities which
may act as alternative devices for building reputation is far from being straightforward.
Suppose that the government has an increasing concern about conservation activities (ac-
tivity 1, in the example in the introduction). Nobody would doubt that 1 should increase
but few would claim that the e¢cient policy also includes increasing subsidies to volunteer
caregiving (activity 2). However, according to our model, there exists a clear rationale for
this combination of subsidies: Subsidizing conservation activities causes a decrease in the
amount of volunteer caregiving, since some volunteers (the most cooperative ones) would
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a similar way.
7.1 Example:
Consider the following example21: Individuals types are uniformly distributed on the interval
[0 1], 1 = 2 and 2 = 1 Thus, thresholds  and  are given by  = 45 ¡
4
51 +
2
52 and
 = 35 +
2
51 ¡
6
52 In the context of the example, the condition 0      1 holds for a
wide range of subsidies. For instance, if 1 = 2 = 0, the separating equilibrium is such that
60% of the population does not undertake any prosocial activity, 20% undertake activity 2
and 20% undertake activity 1. Suppose that 1 = 2 and 2 = 1 Is it socially benecial
to subsidize both activities? The answer is positive. Optimal subsidies in this case would
be ¤1 = 32 and 
¤
2 = 1. These subsidies would induce 100% of the population to undertake
activity 1.
Let us check how this scheme responds to an increase in the cost of activity 1. Consider
that 01 = 3 Our theory predicts that optimal subsidies on both prosocial activities must
decrease. To see this, we rst use Eqs. (3) and (4) to compute the new separating equilibrium
values for  and  as  = 89 ¡
4
91 +
2
92 and  =
5
9 +
2
91 ¡
10
9 2 The new values for optimal
subsidies are given by ¤01 = 54 and 
¤0
2 = 34 (both have been lowered with respect to the values
taken when 1 = 2). According to Lemma 3, the optimal total amount of prosocial activities
does not change. In fact, the new scheme induces half of the population to undertake activity
21The particular case of the uniform distribution considered in this example is developed in Appendix B.
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le 1 and the other half to undertake activity 2. Finally, suppose that the valuation of activity1 reduces up to 01 = 1 = 2 It is clear that in this case the optimal supply of activity 1 iszero. Subsidies on both activities now take the values ¤001 = 0 and ¤002 = 12 , and they induce
100% of the population to undertake activity 2.
It may also be the case that subsidies are negative (i.e., taxes). For instance, if the
agents types follow a uniform distribution, and 1 = 2 = 1 we have ¤1 = 12 ¡
1
22 and
¤2 = 12 . Clearly, 
¤
1  0 for 2  1. If we reduce the social valuations of prosocial activities
to 001 = 002 = 05 we have ¤1 = ¡ 122  0 for all 2 and 
¤
2 = 0. In the extreme case where
prosocial activities have null social valuations, it is optimal that all individuals choose not
to undertake any activity. Thus, optimal taxes would be ¤1 = ¡05 and ¤2 = ¡05.
8 Conclusions
We have shown that the presence of competing signals for sending information about pri-
vate characteristics linked to socially benecial activities must be taken into account when
designing policies based on rewards, incentives or nes on these activities. In settings where
di¤erent activities are available, a subsidy or a fee imposed on one activity may have un-
desired e¤ects if activities that act as potential substitutes are not considered. We study a
context where agents signal their private characteristics through prosocial activities, and a
public decision maker (who is well informed about the relevant signaling game) devises an
incentive scheme that maximizes social welfare.
The formal approach adopted in this paper could also be applied (with minor changes
to the model) to the analysis of career concerns problems and also to status games. For
instance, in a career concerns model, the workers output can be a signal of her ability.
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status game, an agents payo¤s depend on others perception of her wealth, which may be
signaled through conspicuous consumption levels (actions 0 1 and 2). Wealthier people
would face lower costs for each consumption level, and subsidies could be reinterpreted as tax
reductions or exemptions established on certain goods. Again, as we proved in our model,
cross crowding-out e¤ects would play a relevant role in policy-making in this context. For
example, if the goal of the policy-maker is to reduce the aggregate amount of conspicuous
consumption, lowering taxes on consumption of the most luxurious goods (i.e. subsidizing
action 1) may be an e¢cient way of doing so.
In our model, prosocial behavior is driven by a blend of altruistic and self-interested
motivations. Individuals have an instrumental concern for reputation, which is a purely
private motivation. However, individuals are heterogeneous with respect to their willingness
to cooperate, since they are endowed with a certain level of altruism. We may consider an
extended model where individuals have preferences over prosocial activities. In this case,
the agents utilities should include the intrinsic motivation associated to the performance
of each activity. We might not expect substantial changes in the modeling and conclusions
if the preferences about activities depend on the agents types. Regardless of the specic
modeling of intrinsic motivation, including it in the analysis may hide a major idea in the
paper. Namely, that cross crowding-out e¤ects can appear when the relative costs of prosocial
activities are modied by material incentives.
We use the insights derived from our signaling model to analyze the impact of subsidies
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le on social welfare. Our conclusions go beyond the traditional analysis of optimal subsidiza-tion. The public decision maker must not only consider the budgetary cost of introducingsubsidies compared to the social valuation of prosocial activities, but also the private sig-
naling costs of prosocial activities and the individuals reputation concerns. In this way, our
approach embeds a classical problem of incentive design into a signaling structure in which
individuals reputations are critical in determining prosocial behavior. As shown in the pa-
per, the existence of cross crowding-out e¤ects supposes new complexities in the design of
public policies.
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